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NOTES
CHARTER COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN FLORIDA:
PAST LITIGATION AND FUTURE PROPOSALS*
IN'RODUCrION

In 1968, the state electorate adopted a new constitution which completely
revised the structure of local government in Florida.' The constitution broadened the traditional governing powers of counties and municipalities, and
2
authorized the state legislature to further expand such powers by statute. In
addition, all counties were given the option to create special charters for their
own self-government. 3 The inclusion of this last provision marked the first time
in Florida history that counties were uniformly permitted to establish charter
governments.
Charters are formal written instruments which confer powers, duties or
privileges on the county. These county plans conceptually resemble state or
federal constitutions. The 1968 constitution authorized each electing county to
formulate, within certain constraints, the terms of its own individual charter.
This proposed plan would then be submitted to a countywide vote.4 Counties
that adopted charter plans would thereafter look to their charters for resolution
of local problems rather than to the state legislature. Chartered counties would
also be entitled to potentially favorable constitutional and statutory treatment
not available to other counties. 5
The establishment of charter government was designed to remove the resolution of local problems from the legislature's busy agenda and to grant the
county electorate greater control over its regional affairs.6 The counties' success
in satisfying these dual goals has depended on their ability to liberally exercise
charter powers. This note examines the problems which have emerged in defining and implementing charter powers and provisions. The foundation for
this analysis will be laid by tracing the constitutional history of county government in Florida. Next, the relevant provisions of the 1968 constitution will be
reviewed, and the charter system will be contrasted with the former approach
to county government. This note will then analyze the legal consequences of
implementing charter plans as reflected in post-1968 charter county litigation.
This case examination will focus on the three major sources of conflict with
charter provisions: the state constitution, state statutes, and municipal ordi*Editor's Note: This note was the cowinner of the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for the best note submitted in the Spring 1981 quarter.
1.

FLA. CONsr. art. VIii (1968).

3.

Id. art. VIII, §1(c).

2. Id.art. VIH, §1(f).
4. Id.

5. See, e.g., id. art. VIII, §1(d)-(e).
6. Florida ConstitutionalRevision Commission Hearings, No. 50, 219-61 (1966-1968) [hereinafter cited as 1966-1968 Hearings].
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nances. In each area of conflict, the desirability of constitutional revision or
alternative judicial interpretation will be explored. Finally, this note makes
suggestions for the future course of charter county government in Florida.
PRE-1968

HISTORY OF FLORIDA COUNTY GOVERNMENT

The first Florida constitution, adopted in 1838, referred to the counties as
7
units of the state government but did not vest them with any inherent powers.
Rather, the 1838 constitution, and three subsequent revisions, collectively authorized the state legislature to create boards of county commissioners and
s
delegate certain powers to these entities. Pursuant to this authority, the legis-

lature granted all counties a variety of governmental functions. 9 The counties,
however, were viewed as purely administrative subdivisions which existed for
the convenience of state rule, rather than as autonomous governing entities.1o
In contrast, municipalities existed for the benefit of a "community of people"
who lived within such proximity that "an organized agency for the management of their local affairs""- was needed. Yet neither counties nor municipalities had any independent governing powers because they both derived all of
12
their authority from legislative acts.
The 1885 revised constitution included the first article dealing solely with
local government.' 3 The new article declared that counties were political subdivisions of the state, provided for the appointment of county officers, and permitted the legislature to delegate governing powers to the county.' 4 Notwith7.

In

1821, Governor Andrew Jackson promulgated the first ordinance establishing the

"county" as a unit of Florida local government. The ordinance specifically created St. Johns
and Escambia counties, set up a county judicial system and provided for the appointment of
county judges, clerks and sheriff;. Ordinances of Major General Andrew Jackson, 25 FLA.
STAT. ANN. 305, 305-07 (1970). Governor Jackson's provisional government was replaced by a
territorial government which legislated for Florida until the adoption of the first state constitution in 1838. See generally Sparkman, The History and Status of Local Government
Powers in Florida,25 U. FLA. L. REv. 271 (1973).
The 1838 constitution referred to county functions but did not recognize any inherent
county powers. For example, article V of the constitution provided for county probate officers
and county Justices of the Peace. In addition, article IX established a scheme for census-taking
and apportionment which was to be organized on a countywide basis.
8. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §19 (1838); FLA. CONST. art. V, §18 (1861); FLA. CONsT. art. V, §21
(1865); FLA. CONST. art. IV, §21 (1868).
9. See Sparkman, supra note 7, at 273. The counties were used as convenient units for
dividing court jurisdictions, electing state officials and apportioning the population for representation in the general assembly. Id.
10. Id. at 275.
11. State ex rel. Davis v. Town of Lake Placid, 109 Fla. 419, 426-27, 147 So. 468, 471 (1933).
See Sparkman, supra note 7, at 276.
12. The court in Amos v. Matthews stated the traditional rule as to county powers:
"Counties have no inherent powers, but derive their powers solely from the sovereign state....
The exercise of power granted to counties must be in accord with the grant, and any doubt as
to the grant or the extent of the powers granted should be resolved against the county asserting the power." 99 Fla. 1, 11, 126 So. 308, 321 (1930). See also Williams v. Dunnellon, 125 Fla.
114, 169 So. 631 (1936).
13. FLA. CONST. art. VIII (1885). The inclusion of the new article, entitled "Counties and
Cities", reflected the growing state importance in developing efficient local governments.
14. See Sparkman, supra note 7, at 275. The 1885 constitution originally provided for the
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standing these constitutional changes, the county retained its primary status as

an administrative state agency.15
Although the 1885 constitution gave the legislature virtually unbridled control over county government, 16 one constitutional provision attempted to prevent legislative abuses of local control by requiring notice and referendums
before thq legislative enactment of special laws.' 7 Special laws were legislative
acts pertaining to particular persons, things, or specified divisions of the state,
such as a single county.' s In contrast, the legislature was not constitutionally
restricted from passing general laws, 19 which related to subjects, persons, or
things as a class and applied uniformly throughout the state. 20 The legislature
frequently circumvented the restrictions concerning special laws by passing
general laws which had the practical effect of special legislation.21 For example,
the legislature would approve a general law which applied to all counties having a specified population range, but this population range would be drawn
so narrowly that the law only affected a few counties.2 2 These types of populagubernatorial appointment of five commissioners. However, the provision was amended in
1900 and 1944 to provide that county commissioners be elected from county districts. The
1885 constitution had already provided for the election of certain other county officials, including a clerk of the circuit court, a sheriff, a tax collector, and a superintendent of public
instruction. The powers, duties and compensation of these officials were to be determined by
the legislature. FLA. CoNsr. art. VI, §6 (1885).

15. See Sparkman, supra note 7, at 275.
16. Id. at 277-82.
17.

FI.A. CONsT. art. I1, §21 (1885). Section 21 of article III provided that no local or

special bill could be passed unless notice of such intent was published within a certain time
prior to introduction of the bill to the legislature. Section 20 of article III went one step
further by absolutely forbidding the legislature to pass special or local laws in several enumerated areas. For example, no special or local laws were permitted regarding the granting of
divorces, the regulation of decedents' estates, the legitimization of children or the establishment of ferries. Id. §20.
18. The legislature traditionally had distinguished between special laws and local laws.
In State ex rel. Buford v. Daniel, 187 Fla. 270, 273, 99 So. 804, 809 (1924), the supreme court
stated that special laws related to particular persons or things, or to other particular subjects.
In contrast, local laws related to particular subdivisions or portions of the state, or to particular places or classified localities. Because of the close similarity between the two concepts,
the 1968 constitution merged the two concepts into the general phrase special law. The distinctions between special and local laws therefore are no longer important. FLA. CoNST. art. X,

§12(g) (1968).
19. FLA. CoNsr. art. III, §21 (1885).

20. General laws have been defined as laws which operate universally throughout the
state, or uniformly upon certain subjects or permissible classifications. State ex rel. Buford
v. Daniel, 187 Fla. 270, 287, 99 So. 804, 809 (1924).
21. Note, Florida's General Laws of Special or Local Application, 10 U. FIA. L.

REV.

90,

93-96 (1957).
22. E.g., State v. Dade, 157 Fla. 859, 27 So. 2d 283 (1946). In that case, the general law at

issue allowed all counties with populations of over 260,000 to sell bonds to finance construction of transportation facilities. The "general law" was allowed to stand even though only
one county was affected by the legislation. Note, supra note 21, at 96.
The courts purported to safeguard county interests by holding that population alone was
generally not a reasonable basis for classification. See, e.g., Carter v. Norman, 38 So. 2d 80
(Fla. 1948); Anderson v. Board of Pub. Instr., 102 Fla. 695, 136 So. 334 (1931). However,
population acts were permissible where there was some particular relation between the statu-
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tion acts enabled the legislature to manipulate the affairs of selected counties
without technically violating the constitutional mandate. Consequently, the
counties were relatively helpless in safeguarding their local interests from the
state.
Florida lawmakers became increasingly aware that the system of county government authorized by the 1885 constitution needed to be changed. For example, county officials expressed continued discontent with the legislature's
repeated enactment of discriminatory population acts under the guise of general law. 23 Moreover, Florida's rapid transition from a rural to an urban state
generated new demands for county services.2 4 Counties were delayed in responding to these governmental demands because they had no authority to act
without legislative permission.25 Increased requests for local legislation also
forced the state legislature to divert its attention from issues of greater state2 6

wide importance.

In responding to the need for change, state lawmakers began to take notice
of a growing national home rule movement which seemed to offer partial solutions for Florida's local problems. 27 Essentially, the term "home rule" refers to
the transfer of certain state governmental powers to local entities in matters of
local concern. The term does not imply complete local autonomy.28 Home rule,

tory subject and the population limitation. Under this rationale, many population acts were
upheld despite the fact that they might only work against one county. Cf. In re Rouse, 66 So.
2d 42 (Fla. 1953) (divorce-related population act upheld because more divorces occur in
densely populated areas); Lightfoot v. State, 64 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1952) (certain legislation justified because more crime in densely populated areas); Beasley v. Cahoon, 109 Fla. 106, 147 So.
288 (1933) (population-based statute valid which regulated small loans since more small loan
problems in populous counties). See Note, supra note 21, at 95.
23. Sparkman, supra note 7, at 282. Sparkman notes that the modern consensus has been
that most of the population acts were probably unconstitutional. Id.
24. Note, Constitutional Revision: County Home Rule in Florida- The Need for Expansion, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 282 (1966). The authors state that the 1885 constitutional framers
did not foresee Florida's rapid aggregation of nearly two-thirds of the state's population into
15 of the 67 counties. Id. at 283. As the population increased, the need to provide for governmental services such as sewer, water, zoning, police and fire protection became essential.
25. See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra. See generally Danahy, Local Government
for Florida'sMetropolitanAreas, 40 FLA. B.J. 16 (1966).
26. Note, supra note 24, at 283.
27. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REv.
269, 283-90 (1968). Traditionally, most states followed Dillon's Rule with respect to local
governments. That rule stated that local entities only had those powers of self-government
which were granted by the state. L J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §237 (5th ed. 1911).
The concept of home rule began to take hold in the nineteenth century beginning with the
first home rule statute in Iowa in 1851. Other states subsequently adopted various approaches
to home rule based upon the needs of their local governments. The Vanlandingham article surveys the different approaches that states have taken in implementing home rule since its inception in Iowa. Vanlandingham, supra at 284-302. For examples of modern home rule development in other states, see Gierach, Home Rule in Illinois - There are Limits, 66 ILL. B.J.
212 (1977); Glauberman, County Home Rule: An Urban Necessity, I URB. LAw. 170 (1969);
Comment, Home Rule in Pennsylvania, 81 DICK. L. REv. 265 (1977); Comment, Home Rule
in Oregon After LaGrande v. Public Employment Retirement Board, 15 WILLAmh-re L. REv.
311 (1979).
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in its purest sense, dictates that the electorate of each county determine what
particular governmental structure is needed, rather than having a specific form
of government imposed on a county. 29 The selected governmental structure,
however, is designed to service local concerns only, and is not authorized to
usurp state powers.3 0 Florida legislators recognized that home rule concepts
would offer the counties more control over their internal affairs and alleviate
the need for state legislation of local concerns. In addition, the home rule
movement was particularly acceptable because such notions were consistent
with the traditional American ideals of self-governance and independence.31
In 1956, a special amendment was added to the 1885 constitution which
enabled Dade County to become the first home rule county in Florida.32 The
amendment permitted the Dade County electorate to adopt a home rule charter
and specifically empowered the county to perform a variety of functions traditionally handled by the state.33 Significantly, the amendment recognized that
Dade county had inherent powers of self-government, thereby obviating the
need for state authorization of local acts.34 The county was still bound by the
provisions of the 1885 constitution and the state's general laws, but it was allowed to pass ordinances which conflicted with laws applicable only to Dade
County.s Under specified conditions, the county was even permitted to enact
ordinances which conflicted with general law. 36Although the Dade County ex28. Note, supra note 24, at 284. The proponents of home rule argue that this form of
government will increase the efficiency of the state legislature in handling state matters, and
decrease unnecessary interference in local affairs. This result would be desirable since passage

of local legislation may be pro forma anyway. Moreover, self-government is consistent with
American traditions. Proponents also claim that home rule will provide greater potential for
local units to cope with urbanized society and will be psychologically advantageous in that
it will foster an increased sense of civic responsibility. Vanlandingham, supra note 27, at
270-71.
29. Vanlandingham, supra note 27, at 270-71.
30. Id.
31. Id.

32. FLA.

CONST.

art. VIII, §11 (1885, amended 1956). The section was originally added

to the 1885 constitution by an amendment which had been proposed by law in 1941 and

adopted in 1942. However, the section was amended by general election on November 6, 1956.
33.

FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §l1(1)(a)-(j)

(1885, amended 1956). The 1956 constitutional

amendment specifically authorized Dade County to fix the number and method of election
of the county commissioners, transfer all municipal powers to the county, establish or
abolish new municipalities and special taxing districts, provide a method for the recall of
any commissioner, abolish certain county offices, and do everything necessary to carry on a
central metropolitan government. Id.
Cf. Chase v. Cowart, 102 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1958) (Dade County amendment authorized

county to abolish all boards or other governmental units wholly within the county, including the Budget Commission).
34. FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §11(1)(b) (1885, amended 1956). The county was authorized to
"do everything necessary to carry on a central metropolitan government." Id.
35. The amendment bound Dade County to all provisions of the constitution and to
any law which applied to "Dade County and any other one or more counties." FLA. CONSr.
art. VIII, §11(5) (1885, amended 1956). Dade County was also forbidden to limit or restrict

the power and jurisdiction of state agencies, bureaus and commissions. Id. §11(7).
36. See, e.g., id. §11(1)(c) (Dade may change boundaries, merge, consolidate, and abolish
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periment offered an apparent solution for the governmental problems of other
Florida counties, Dade continued to be the only home rule county prior to the
1968 revision.37
THE 1968 CONSTITUTIONAL REvISION

The state electorate adopted a completely revised constitution in 1968 which
included a new framework for local government. Article VIII of the new constitution provided for the expansion of both county and municipal home rule. 38
Unlike previous constitutions, article VIII expressly dealt with the self-governing powers of the local entities.3 9 More importantly, the Dade County approach
of home rule by individual constitutional amendment was obviated by granting
40
all counties blanket permission to adopt charters.
The legislative history of the 1968 constitution suggests that the two primary objectives of charter government were to reduce the demand for local
bills in the legislature and to allow citizens greater latitude in forming the
county plan most responsive to their needs. 41 In accordance with the latter objective, charters could be adopted, amended, or repealed only by vote of the
county electorate. 42 Yet, despite the presumed advantages of chartering a
municipal corporations even though the corporations are created by the constitution or
legislature). Dade County is presently the only county with the partial authority to contravene general law. However, §11(9) of the Dade County amendment adds that the legislature intended §11 to be strictly construed to maintain the supremacy of the constitution and
general law. Consequently, many courts will not permit Dade County to circumvent general
law absent express authority in the home rule amendment.
37. The Dade County experiment was not without problems, judging from the various
challenges to Dade's charter authority. Cf. Board of County Comm'rs. of Dade County v.
Boswell, 167 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1964) (court invalidated Dade ordinance prohibiting fortunetelling because general law allowed same); Kaulakis v. Boyd, 138 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1962) (charter
provision providing that Dade shall be liable for tort actions invalid in light of article III,
§22 of the constitution which states that all counties are immune from tort liability). For a
survey of litigation involving Dade County, see Note, supra note 24, at 285-302.
38. FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, '§§1, 2 (1968). See generally Levinson & Ireland, Florida
ConstitutionalLaw, 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 551 (1974).
39. FLA. CONsr. art. VIII, §§1-2 (1968).
40. Id. §1(c).
41. 1966-1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 219-61. During the December 9, 1966 meetings,
Commissioner Matthews remarked that home rule, as most of the legislature understood it,
meant that the legislature was getting away from local bills. Id. at 220. Matthews also noted
that if the state was going to transfer what was commonly known as home rule, the legislature
had to give that local body the same authority that the legislature had regarding local affairs.
Id. at 223. Reply Brief for Appellant at 9-19, Sarasota County v. City of North Port, No.
79-3239 (12th Cir. Ct. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-2226 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. Oct. 8, 1980), aff'd
per curiam (Fla. 2d D.C.A. May 18, 1981).
42. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §l(c) (1968). The legislature was also authorized to establish
the procedure for adopting county charters. FLA. STAT. §§125.60-.64 (1979) was subsequently
enacted to accomplish this purpose. The statute provides for the formation of a charter commission upon adoption of a resolution by the board of county commissioners or upon the submission of a petition to the county commission signed by at least 15% of the voters. The
charter commission is composed of 11 to 15 members who are appointed by the county commission or a legislative delegation. No member of the legislature or county commission may
be a member of the charter commission. Generally, the charter commission is authorized to
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county, the constitutional framers recognized that not all county residents

would prefer a charter form of government. Charter provisions were therefore
designed to be strictly optional in order to carry out the wishes of the entire
43

state citizenry.

Sections l(f) and l(g) of article VIII form the heart of the county home rule
provisions. These two sections clearly distinguish charter from non-charter
counties. Non-charter counties are less powerful than charter counties because
section l(f) gives them only those powers of self-government which are granted
by either special or general law. 44 Furthermore, non-chartered counties may
only enact ordinances not inconsistent with special or general law. 45 Any conflict between county and municipal ordinances is resolved in the municipality's
favor. 46 In contrast, section l(g) grants charter counties all powers of local selfgovernment unless these powers are inconsistent with either special laws approved by county referendum or with general law.4 7 Further, county ordinances
study alternatives for charter government in the county, vote on a proposed charter and
forward that charter to the county commission for a special county-wide referendum.
43. FLA. CoNsT. art. VIII, §l(c) (1968). Section l(c) provides that county governments may
be established by charter. See notes 243-244 infra for reasons why counties might avoid charter
government.
Although the adoption of charter plans was purely optional, the legislature enacted the
Optional County Charter Law in 1974 which provided three alternative types of formats for
structuring charter governments. FLA. STAT. §§125.80-.88 (1974). The Optional Charter Law
dictates that counties adopt either an executive, managerial, or chairman-administrator form
of management. Section 125.84 states that counties must choose one of these three forms. On
the other hand, §125.83 implies that the optional forms are merely useful suggestions. Because §125.84 is more specific than §125.83, it is likely that the three forms are mandatory
provisions. However, a purer application of the theory of home rule would require that such
provisions be permissive. In any event, a county could conceivably avoid the §125.84 reqpuirements and adopt a different type of charter if the legislature approved such action
through a special act.
44. FLA. CoNsr. art. VIII, §l(f) (1968). Section 1(f) provides: "Counties not operating
under county charters shall have such power of self-government as is provided by general or
special law. The board of county commissioners of a county not operating under a charter
may enact, in a manner prescribed by general law, county ordinances not inconsistent with
general or special law, but an ordinance in conflict with a municipal ordinance shall not be
effective within the municipality to the extent of such conflict." Id. The version of §l(f) that
was recommended by the Constitutional Revision Commission would have stated that noncharter counties "shall have all powers of self-government except as otherwise provided by
general law." 26A FLA. STAT. ANN. 268, 270-71 (1970) (§1(f) commentary). However, the
Commission's version was changed so that now non-charter counties have only those powers
of self-government which are provided by general or special law. Id. The first recommendation would probably have better accomplished the legislature's goal of alleviating the passage
of local bills by state lawmakers. Nevertheless, the current version expanded non-charter
county home rule powers to some extent by expressly recognizing that non-charter counties
have an important governing function and are not simply administrative units.
45. FLA. CoNsr. art. VIII, §1(f) (1968).
46. Id.

47. Id. §1(g). Section l(g) provides: "Counties operating under county charters shall have
all powers of local self-government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law
approved by vote of the electors. The governing body of a county operating under a charter
may enact county ordinances not inconsistent with general law. The charter shall provide
which shall prevail in the event of conflict between county and municipal ordinances." Id.
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are not automatically preempted by conflicting municipal ordinances. Rather,
each charter delineates the balance of power between the county and its municipalities. 45 Thus, while both types of counties are still bound by the constitution
and state general law, charter counties have an inherently broader power base
and are no longer subject to special laws unless the county electorate specifically
approves them by referendum. 49 In addition, each charter county electorate
may determine the strength of its charter government because the residents decide whether county ordinances will prevail over municipal ordinances.
CHARTER COUNTIES AND

PosT-1968

LITIGATION

Five of Florida's sixty-seven counties have adopted charter governments.5 0
51
Charter plans were approved by Dade County in 1957, Volusia in 1970,52
Sarasota in 1972,r 3 Broward in 1975,14 and Pinellas in 1980. 55 The creation of
these charter counties predictably spawned considerable litigation. In par.
ticular, the judiciary was requested to clarify the scope of charter powers and
compare these powers with those of the state or municipalities. Charter counties
were typically involved in three major areas of controversy: conflicts with the
state constitution; conflicts with state general law; and conflicts with municipalities. The legislature attempted to deal with some of these controversial
areas when it drafted the proposed 1978 constitution.56 Although the proposal
48. Id.
49. The commentary to the Florida Statutes Annotated reprint of the 1968 constitution
notes that charter counties are presumptively considered to have broad powers of selfgovernment. Since non-charter counties have only those powers granted by law, charter and
non-charter counties apparently operate from different sources of power. Both entities could
effectively be restrained to the same powers depending upon the types of general law which
the legislature adopts. 26A FLA. SrAT. ANN. 268, 270-71 (1970), (§l(f)-(g), commentary).
50. However, at least nine non-charter counties have had proposed county charters that
were defeated at county-wide elections. See note 245 infra.
51. DADE COUNTY HOME RULE CHARTER (1957). The Dade County Home Rule Amendment
to the 1885 constitution was adopted by the state electorate on November 6, 1956. The Dade
County Home Rule Charter was adopted by the county electorate on May 21, 1957 and has
been amended numerous times. Article VIII, §6 incorporated Dade County's 1956 home rule
amendment into the new 1968 constitution in its entirety. Consequently, Dade County operates
somewhat differently from the other charter counties because its powers still derive from the
original home rule amendment. Nevertheless, Dade County will be treated as any other
charter county for the purposes of this Note, since Dade is generally subject to the same restrictions as other post-1968 charter counties. But see text accompanying notes 83-89 infra.
Occasionally, the home rule amendment will specifically authorize Dade County to perform
certain functions that other charter counties are not expressly or impliedly authorized to
perform. In that event, Dade County may be in a somewhat superior position to other
charter counties, which derive their authority from their home rule charters, the general
provisions of article VIII, §1(g) and state law.
52. COUNTY OF VOLUSIA HOME RULE CHARTER (1970), reprinted in Fla. Laws, ch. 70-966.
COUNTY HOME RULE CHARTER (1972).

53.

SARASOTA

54.

BROWARD COUNTY CHARTER

(1975).

55. PINELLAS CoUrNTrY HOME RULE CHARTER (1980), reprinted in Fla. Laws, ch. 80-590.
56. FLA. PROPOSED CONST. art. VIII (1978). Article II, section 2 of the 1968 constitution
mandated the establishment of a 37-member constitutional revision commission which would
meet ten years after the adoption of the 1968 constitution to discuss proposals for constitu-
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was defeated at a statewide election, an analysis of the changes the 1978 constitution would have made provides assistance in understanding the problems
besetting charter counties.
Conflicts with the State Constitution
The first major area of controversy involves the invalidation of charter
provisions by the state constitution. The constitution properly supercedes all
inconsistent county enactments because the theory of home rule only seeks to
preserve local autonomy in local matters. 57 It is not always clear, however,
whether a particular constitutional provision was intended to apply to charter
counties. Courts have generally construed constitutional provisions strictly
against the counties to maintain state supremacy. 8 Nonetheless, courts have
tempered this state interest by balancing it against the concurrent interest of
encouraging charter home rule. 59 The judiciary has reviewed challenges to
charter authority involving several constitutional provisions. However, only
two sources of conflict will be considered here: article VIII, section 4 (transfers of local powers) and article VIII, section 1(h) (county taxation).
The first source of constitutional conflict is article VIIi, section 4, which
provides that "by law or by resolution"6 0 of the governing bodies, any function
tional revision. Consequently, in July, 1977 a revision commission was appointed whose work
product was intended to bypass the legislature and be presented directly to the state voters.
Uhlfelder, The Machinery of Revision, Symposium on the Proposed Revisions to the Florida
Constitution, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 575 (1978). The revision commission prepared a modified
constitution which was submitted to the voters but subsequently defeated at a state election.
For a survey of the changes the 1978 proposed constitution would have made, see Symposium
on the ProposedRevisions to the Florida Constitution, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. Rv. 575 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Symposium].
57. See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
58. E.g., In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 313 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1975). That
opinion addressed the question of whether the Governor or Sarasota County had the authority to fill the vacancy of the county tax collector who had died during his term. Article IV,
§l(f) gave the Governor authority to fill vacancies unless otherwise provided for in the constitution. Sarasota County's charter did not expressly provide for the vacancy of the tax collector, but the county claimed that article VIII, §l(d) provided an alternative constitutional
procedure by which charter counties could fill public vacancies. The Supreme Court of
Florida held that the Governor should fill the vacancy since the Governor's express constitutionar authority should be strictly construed against the county. Id. at 721. See also Socash v.
Volusia County, 267 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1972); State ex rel. Dade County v. Dickinson, 230 So. 2d
130 (Fla. 1969); Dade County v. Kelly, 99 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1957).
The Office of the Attorney General has also addressed the question of the supremacy of
state constitutional provisions over charter provisions. Cf. Op. Arr'Y GEN. FLA. 079-109 (1979)
(charter county probably does not have authority to enact ordinance providing for imposition of civil penalties by county agencies in light of article I, §18 of the constitution).
59. E.g., Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp. v. County of Volusia, 348 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1977). The Hudson Pulp and Paper Corporation alleged that the county's imposition of ad
valorem taxes on Hudson's forest property violated article 1, §§2 and 9, and article VII, §9(b)
of the Florida constitution. These articles referred to property rights and restrictions on governmental taxation. The district court upheld the county tax on the theory that charter
counties were inherently vested with the authority to impose the type of taxes in question.
348 So. 2d at 45. See note 230 infra.
60. FA. CONST. art. VIII, §4. Section 4 provides: "By law or by resolution of the gov.
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or power of a county, municipality, or special district may be transferred to or
contracted to be performed by each respective entity. Transfers of power are
not permitted without the approval of each local entity's electorate, unless
"otherwise provided by law." 61 Section 4 was a completely new addition to the
constitution and there is sparse legislative history concerning its purpose.6 2 One
constitutional drafter and former state representative has stated that the section was intended to allow local units to transfer governmental services without a special constitutional amendment.6 3 In particular, the drafter noted that
the section was designed to facilitate transfers related to the assessment and
collection of municipal taxes.64 Additionally, the debates in both the 1968 Revision Commission and the Florida House of Representatives suggest that the
section was intended to allow flexibility in local government and was not
perceived as a restriction on home rule.60
erning bodies of each of the governments affected, any function or power of a county, municipality or special district may be transferred to or contracted to be performed by another
county, municipality or special district, after approval by vote of the electors of the transferor
and approval by vote of the electors of the transferee, or as otherwise provided by law." Id.
§4.
61. Id.
62. 26A FLA. STAT. ANN. 331 (1970) (commentary); Reply Brief for Appellant at 23-27,
Sarasota County v. City of North Port, No. 79-3239 (12th Cir. Ct. 1979), appeal docketed, No.
80-2226 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. Oct. 8, 1980), afl'd per curiam (Fla. 2d D.C.A. May 13, 1981). See text
accompanying notes 95-99 infra.
63. 26A FLA. STAT. ANN. 331 (1970) (commentary). Former State Representative
D'Alemberte, a participant in the drafting and adoption of the 1968 constitution, prepared
the commentaries to each section of the 1968 constitution. Mr. D'Alemberte noted that transfers of local powers were previously accomplished by special constitutional amendment, when
not provided by the general power of the legislature. See, e.g., FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §§10(a),
12-21, art. XX, §1 (1885). All of these transfers related to the assessment and collection of
municipal taxes. In 1954, the 1885 constitution was amended to allow the tax collector to
assess and collect municipal taxes if authorized by special or general act and approved by the
electors of the municipality. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §22 (1885, amended 1954).
The local governments, however, still could not transfer or contract away any of its powers
or functions without petitioning the legislature for a local bill. Section 4, as recommended by
the revision commission, allowed municipalities or special districts to transfer functions to
the county or to each other after separate voter approval. The legislature was therefore no
longer obligated to authorize such transfers through local bills. The provision was apparently
adopted by the revision commission without debate. In addition, the detailed debates concerning the home rule provisions contain no reference to potential limitations by §4 on
charter counties. Reply Brief for Appellee at 24-25, Sarasota County v. City of North Port,
No. 79-3239 (12th Cir. Ct. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-2226 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. Oct. 8, 1980),
aff'd per curiam (Fla. 2d D.C.A. May 13, 1981). The §4 enactment consequently appears to
have been intended as a permissive statute designed to facilitate local agreements and functions, rather than as a measure for restricting local powers.
64. 26A FLA. STAT. ANN. 331 (1970) (commentary). See note 63 supra.
65. See note 63 supra. The 1968 Revision Commission recommended that municipalities
or special districts be allowed to transfer functions to the county or to each other. The Commission's version of §4 was amended by the Florida House of Representatives on June 28,
1968 as a result of proposals offered by Representatives Sweeney and Meyers. Representative
Sweeney explained during the floor debates that his amendment would additionally allow
counties to contract for services with a city, and stated that local government units should
have the power to "freely contract back and forth." Representative Meyers agreed, concluding
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The Florida supreme court nevertheless interpreted section 4 as a limitation
on charter county powers in SarasotaCounty v. Town of Longboat Key.66 Sarasota County's charter provided that charter amendments could be proposed
by ordinance and would become effective if approved by the countywide electorate. 7 The county commissioners accordingly proposed an ordinance which
authorized a series of charter amendments which would transfer complete
control of certain governmental services from four municipalities to the
county. 8 The municipalities brought suit to enjoin the pending county election on the theory that section 4 of the constitution also required separate approval from each municipality.9 Sarasota County replied that the charter
powers described in article VIII impliedly exempted charter counties from the
section 4 transfer requirements.7 0 In addition, the county pointed out that
section 4 permitted the initiation of transfers of powers either "by [statutory]
law or by resolution of the governing bodies."' 71 Accordingly, the county argued
that section 125 of the Florida Statutes72 impliedly excepted charter counties
from the strictures of section 4, since that statute specifically authorized charter
counties to provide uniform countywide services.78
The Sarasota County court noted that significant principles of local autonomy were at issue because municipalities could be effectively abolished by such
countywide proposals. 74 Consequently, the court held that section 4 should
that §4 was intended to allow cities and counties to either transfer or contract for mutual
services, resulting in "greater flexibility back and forth." Reply Brief for Appellant at 26,
Sarasota County v. City of North Port, No. 79-3239 (12th Cir. Ct. 1979), appeal docketed, No.
80-2226 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. Oct. 8, 1980), aJ'd per curiam (Fla. 2d D.C.A. May 13, 1981).
66. 355 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1978).
67. SARASOTA CouNTY HOME RULE CHARTER art. VII, §7.1 (1976). In 1979 a new county
charter was adopted which amended §7.1. See note 177 infra.
68. 355 So. 2d at 1198. The amendment purported to transfer the services of air and
water pollution control, parks and recreation, roads and bridges, planning and zoning, and
police from the city to the county.
69. Id. at 1201. The trial court originally granted the injunction on the theory that the
transfer would effectively change the county into an article VIII, §3 consolidated government.
However, the supreme court rejected the trial court's interpretation and instead affirmed the
injunction on the theory that the proposed transfers violated article VIII, §4. 355 So. 2d at
1199.
70. 355 So. 2d at 1201.
71. Id. See note 60 supra.
72. FLA. STAT. §125.86(7) (1979). The statute provided: "It is the specific legislative intent
to recognize that a county charter may properly determine that certain governmental areas
are more conducive to uniform county-wide enforcement and may provide the county government powers in relation to those areas as recognized and as may be amended from time to
time by the people of that county."
73. 355 So. 2d at 1201.
74. Id. at 1199. Although the supreme court may have been correct in noting that the
municipalities could be emasculated by charter powers, the court may have misunderstood
the thrust of charter home rule. The residents of a county are permitted to include charter
provisions which limit municipal powers within certain constraints, since the theory of home
rule seeks to offer the citizens wide latitude in structuring their own local government. County
residents could, however, limit county usurpation of municipal powers by providing for such
limitation in the charter. See text accompanying notes 240-242 infra.
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apply to both charter and non-charter counties since no contrary legislative
intent could be gleaned from the express language of that section.7 5 The court
acknowledged that the legislature could initiate transfers of local powers
through the enactment of general law, but rejected Sarasota County's claim
that section 125 of the statutes sufficiently modified section 4 procedures for
charter countiesJr Rather, the court stated that section 4 contemplated a separate legislative act addressed to a specific transfer, whereas section 125 merely
77
authorized general county police powers.
Subsequent cases have narrowed the Sarasota County rationale to include
only those transfers of power which completely divest municipalities of their
governmental functions. 78 For example, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held
in one case that the county had not infringed on a city's library program by
requiring that city residents contribute tax revenue to the county library system.7 9 The court noted that the transferee in Sarasota County would have divested the municipalities of all power over certain functions, but that the
municipality in the instant case was still empowered to operate its own library
The 1968 constitutional revisors discussed the impact of charter counties on the municipalities during the revision hearings. At one point, Commissioner Turlington asked Commissioner
Gautier whether a charter county ordinance would prevail over a municipal ordinance in the
event of conflict. Commissioner Gautier replied it would be up to the people in the county to
make that provision by the terms of the charter. 1966-1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 252. He
later added that such matters "would have to be resolved within the charter, and depending
on what the people wanted, if they wanted a countywide government that would supercede
the city government, yes." Id. at 253.
75. 355 So. 2d at 1201. The supreme court briefly alluded to the legislative intent behind
§4 in a footnote. The court referred to a Florida League of Cities opinion which noted that
a pre-1968 proposed amendment to §4 would have added the words "unless otherwise provided by charter." This amendment was not adopted by the revision commission. The League
claimed that the commission's refusal to adopt this proposal conclusively showed that the
commission rejected the notion of transferring municipal powers solely by county resolution.
Id. at 1201 n.15. The supreme court did not specifically comment on the import of the commission's actions. In any event, the court failed to expressly consider the other legislative
intentions surrounding the adoption of §4.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., City of Palm Beach Gardens v. Barnes, 390 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1980). In
Barnes, the circuit court enjoined the city from implementing its law enforcement contract
with the county sheriff in the absence of §4 voter approval. The Florida supreme court
reversed, stating that although the sheriff was a county official, the constitutional framers did
not intend to apply §4 to sheriffs. Rather, the sheriff was acting as an independent
contractor and was not the county taxing entity contemplated by §4. The court added that
this type of contracting for services was clearly different from the situation where a municipality transfers or contracts away its entire police powers to the county, hence the Sarasota
County decision was not controlling. Id. at 1189.
79. City of Ormond Beach v. County of Volusia, 383 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1980).
Section 202.1 of the Volusia County Charter permitted the county to assume municipal
functions whenever the municipality so requested. Ormond Beach did not request the county
to assume the city's library functions. Accordingly, the city alleged that Volusia County had
effected an impermissible transfer of powers by establishing a county library system operative
in Ormond Beach. The court held, however, that the county had not impermissibly transferred powers since Ormond Beach still had the power to maintain its own library system.
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system.8 0 Similarly, the Florida supreme court upheld a charter county ordinance which authorized a "tourist room tax" to finance the renovation of a
city-owned football stadium.". The city claimed the renovation plans would
require transferring jurisdiction of the stadium to the county, in violation of
section 4 and Sarasota County. The supreme court reasoned, however, that no
complete transfer of powers had occurred because the county was merely allo82
cating tax revenues while the city continued to own and control the facility.
s
The supreme court in MetropolitanDade County v. City of Miami further

limited Sarasota County by creating a Dade County exception to the section 4
transfer requirements. Dade County's 1956 home rule amendment had been
incorporated in its entirety into the 1968 revision and still controlled that
county's governing powers.8 4 The amendment specifically authorized the county
to establish its own method of transferring municipal functions s5 When the
county enacted a comprehensive taxicab ordinance, two municipalities alleged
that the county had impermissibly seized their regulatory powers.8 6 The trial
court relied on Sarasota County in holding that section 4 required municipal
approval of such charter ordinances. However, the supreme court determined
that the true question was whether section 4 prevailed over the express authorization of Dade's home rule amendment.8 7 The majority opined that the
main purpose of construing constitutional provisions was to "ascertain the intent of the framers and to effectuate the object designed to be accomplished."8 8
Because Dade's explicit constitutional authority reflected a clear and unambiguous effort to preserve Dade County home rule, the court concluded that the
home rule amendment superceded section 489
Notwithstanding its narrowed application, Sarasota County continues to be
viable law. For example, the City of North Port recently sued Sarasota County
80. Id. at 673.
81. Miami Dolphins v. Metropolitan Dade County, 394 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1981). The City
of Miami, which owned the Orange Bowl Football Stadum, had an agreement with the Miami

Dolphins football team which required the Dolphins' consent for any renovation or reconstruction of the stadium. According to the City of Miami, the county plans for renovation of
the Orange Bowl would require transferring jurisdiction of the stadium to the county. The
court disagreed, stating that the county could simply contract that the city handle all the
renovation work, and that the county would merely fund the project. Id. at 985.
82. Id.
83.

No. 57, 406 (Fla. Oct. 16, 1980).

84. See note 51 supra.
85. FLA. CONsr. art. VII, §ll(1)(d) (1885), states that the charter "may provide a method
by which any and all of the functions or powers of any municipal corporation or other gov-

ernmental unit in Dade County may be transferred to the Board of County Commissioners of
Dade County."
86. No. 57,406 at 476. The voters of Dade County amended their charter in 1976 to
permit the county to regulate taxicabs county-wide. In 1979 the county enacted an ordinance
designed to provide comprehensive taxicab regulation. Section 323.052(1) of the Florida
Statutes provided, however, that municipalities could retain their taxicab powers unless the
municipalities transferred their authority to the county. Id. at 477.
87. Id. at 476.
88. Id.
89. Id. Despite the supreme court's ruling on the §4 issue, the court affirmed the trial
court's judgment for different reasons. See note 180 infra.
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90
alleging that a particular charter amendment violated section 4. Sarasota's
charter had formerly provided that municipal ordinances would supercede conflicting county ordinances, but the charter amendment added that county
ordinances relating to land use planning would prevail over conflicting ordinances passed by the City of North Port.,' The Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court
ruled that the charter amendment violated section 4 of the constitution and

Sarasota County,9 2 and the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed per

curiam. 3 Consequently, the validity of Sarasota County's amendment and
remains in question pending
similar amendments in other home rule 9charters
4
final determination by the higher courts.

As a result of the Sarasota County line of cases, charter governments have
been hindered in fully exercising charter powers. There are three employable
alternatives which might relieve charter counties of their section 4 burdens
and clarify the validity of charter provisions. One alternative is for the judiciary
to reconsider its rationale in Sarasota County. Such a result would be appropriate because the Sarasota County court appears to have undercut the legislative
purpose of section 4 and the philosophy of home rule by applying section 4
to charter counties. 95 As previously noted, section 4 was designed to facilitate
local functions such as municipal tax assessments. 96 In addition, the debates in
both the Florida House of Representatives and the revision commission hearings indicate that section 4 was intended to be permissive rather than restrictive.97 Finally, the spirit of home rule supports the supremacy of charter powers
90. Sarasota County v. City of North Port, No. 79-3239 (12th Cir. Ct. 1979), appeal
docketed, No. 80-2226 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. Oct. 8, 1980), afJ'd per curiam (Fla. 2d D.C.A. May 13,
1981).
91. SARASOTA COUNTY HOME RULE CHARTER, art. IV, §4.1 (1976). Section 4.1 of the charter
originally stated: "A municipal ordinance shall prevail within the limits of the municipality."
The amendment proposed by the ordinance and submitted for referendum on November 6,
1979 added the following proviso: "provided, however, that county ordinances pertaining to
land use planning, zoning, and subdivision regulations shall prevail in the event of conflict
with the municipal ordinances of the City of North Port to the extent of such conflict."
92. Reply Brief for Appellee at 4, Sarasota County v. City of North Port, No. 79-3239
(12th Cir. Ct. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 82-2226 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. Oct. 8, 1980), af'd per
curiam (Fla. 2d D.C.A. May 13, 1981).
93. Id.
94. In a similar Broward County case, the City of Fort Lauderdale challenged the validity
of §8.04 of the Broward County Home Rule Charter, which provided that municipal
ordinances prevail over county ordinances except in enumerated areas. The circuit court upheld the provision, holding that the Broward Charter could be validly amended to enable
county ordinances to prevail in other areas. City of Fort Lauderdale v. Broward County, No.
76-1244 (17th Cir. Ct. Fla. 1976). The decision was affirmed per curiam by the Fourth District
Court of Appeal. City of Fort Lauderdale v. Broward County, 351 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1977). Such differing case results portend increased confusion in determining the proper scope
of charter amendment provisions.
95. Although express state constitutional provisions generally should be construed against
implied charter powers, the intent of the framers should be influential when interpreting the
scope of constitutional language. See State ex rel. West v. Gray, 74 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1954);
Amos v. Matthews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So. 308 (1930).
96. See text accompanying notes 62-65 supra.
97. See note 65 supra.
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in matters of local concern.98 In light of the permissive tone of the section 4
legislative history, little justification exists for allowing the section to frustrate
the actions of charter governments. 99
The reasoning used by the Florida supreme court in Metropolitan Dade
County could be used to support the inapplicability of section 4 to charter
counties.100 That opinion exempted Dade County from the transfer provision
based on the premise that the provision should not be allowed to thwart the
legislative intent in creating Dade County's 1956 home rule amendment.10 '
The philosophy of post-1968 charter home rule and the legislative intent behind section 4 similarly justify a broader charter exception to the transfer of
power restrictions. Like Dade County, each charter county could then establish
its own transfer provisions pursuant to its charter. The courts, however, appear
hesitant to overrule SarasotaCounty and instead have repeatedly distinguished
the case on its facts. 1 02 Therefore, it is improbable that charter counties will
obtain such relief from the judiciary in resolving the transfer of powers dilemma.
Another possible solution to the transfer problem is legislative activation of
the section 4 clause which permits the transfer of powers by voter approval "or
as otherwise provided by law."' 0 3 State legislators could enact a general law
specifically granting charter counties the option of providing different methods
of transferring powers. The legislature would likely be amenable to such a
law in light of existing statutory provisions granting charter counties wide
home rule powers. 04 In addition, the courts could then use the state law to
justify the future inappositeness of Sarasota County.
A final alternative is the repeal of section 4 through constitutional amendment. In fact, the defeated 1978 proposed constitution entirely eliminated the
section 4 provision with the express intention of abrogating the Sarasota County
rule. 05 Legislators who participated in the 1978 constitutional debates also
noted that the logic of Sarasota County potentially invalidated numerous
interlocal agreements supposedly authorized by statutory law. 08 Although
98. See text accompanying notes 27-31 &41 supra.
99. Reply Brief for Appellant at 27, Sarasota County v. City of North Port, No. 79-3239
(12th Cir. Ct. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-2226 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. Oct. 1980), aff'd per curiam

(Fla. 2d D.CA. May 13, 1981).
100. See text accompanying notes 83-89 supra.
101. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
102. See text accompanying notes 78-85 supra.
103. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
104. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§125.81-.86; 166.021(3)(c) (1979).
105. FLA. PROPOSED CONSr. art. VIII, §4 (1978) (commentary). See text accompanying note

56 supra.See generally Symposium, supra note 56, at 1161-62.
106. Florida ConstitutionalRevision commission Hearings,37-42, 101-112, 125-129 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings]. During the hearings on Wednesday, March 8, 1978, Com-

missioner DeGrove proposed that §4 be removed from the constitution. The Commissioner
stated that removing §4 would make it easier to achieve autonomy and efficiency in local
government. Id. at 38. Commissioner Overton questioned Commissioner DeGrove on the impact of the Sarasota County decision, and Commissioner DeGrove xeplied that he believed the
case was erroneously interpreted. Commissioner Overton remarked that "a lot of people feel
that way about it [the decision]." Id. at 40.
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Florida lawmakers appear willing to abandon the transfer provision, constitutional amendments are dilatory procedures. In light of the improbability of
prompt constitutional revision or judicial action, the most efficient solution 1to7
the section 4 controversy seems to be legislative relief through general law. 0
Double Taxation
The second major source of conflict between charter counties and the state
108
constitution involves the taxation provisions of article VIII section 1(h). Section 1(h) limits county spending powers by prohibiting county taxation of
municipal property to finance services rendered exclusively for unincorporated
areas. 10 9 Like the section 4 transfer provision, section 1(h) was a new addition
to the state constitution and has been judicially applied to both charter and
noncharter counties." 0 Unlike section 4, however, the 1968 debates leading to
the passage of section 1(h) indicate that this taxation provision was intended to
be constitutionally restrictive."11
Section 1(h) was adopted primarily to remedy the double taxation problem
The commission voted to strike §4 on March 8. However, on March 9, 1978, Commissioner Matthews suggested that the commission reexamine the §4 issue because some
commissioners apparently misunderstood the effect of removing the provision. Id. at 125. Consequently, the Commission reconsidered the §4 motion in detail.
On reconsideration, Commissioner DeGrove noted that §4 had never been used to bring
about a transfer of governmental functions because the section was an awkard, prohibiting
mechanism that required multiple resolutions by the governing bodies. Rather, such transfers
were typically accomplished under chapter 163 of the Florida Statutes dealing with interlocal
agreements. Commissioner Messer asked whether the joint resolutions between the City of
Tallahassee and Leon County were valid in light of Sarasota County since these resolutions
were adopted under chapter 163 procedures. Commissioner DeGrove replied that in his
opinion, the Sarasota County decision rendered the interlocal agreements null and void. Id. at
108. After further debates, the commission again voted to strike §4 from the constitution. It
is therefore apparent that the Florida lawmakers consciously intended to overturn the
Sarasota County rule.
Note that the Office of the Attorney General had also previously suggested that chapter
163 interlocal agreements authorized by the Florida Statutes might need §4 approval. See Op.
Arr'Y G N. FLA. 075-156 (1975).
107. The legislature recently enacted a statute which deals with §4, but does not directly
address the charter county problem. FLA. STAT. §125.0101 (1979, Supp. 1981) provides that the
legislative intent of the act is to permit counties to contract for services with municipalities
and special districts as provided in §4. The statute enumerates particular types of services
which local entities might contract to perform and restricts certain county attempts to impose
service charges or taxes pursuant to such performance. Subsection (5) effectively exempts Dade
County from the application of the statute, but does not address the authority of post-1968
charter counties.
108. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §l(h) (1968).
109. Section 1(h) provides: "Property situated within municipalities shall not be subject
to taxation for services rendered by the county exclusively for the benefit of the property or
residents of unincorporated areas." Id.
110. FLA. STAT. ANN. §1(h), (1970) (commentary).
111. 1966-1968 Hearings,supra note 6, at 606-635. During the November 30, 1966 hearings,
Commissioner Martin explained that the object of the proposed amendment was to prevent
the county from forcing the cities to pay for services which the cities did not receive. Id. at 606.
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affecting municipal residents. 112 These residents traditionally paid city property taxes for municipal services and county property taxes for general countywide services. The double taxation problem arose when Florida's urbanization
forced counties to also provide municipal-type services to their unincorporated
areas.112 Unable or unwilling to totally fund these services from taxes on unincorporated areas, the counties obtained partial financing from taxes collected
in the incorporated cities. Consequently, city residents were forced to support
municipal services for both the county and city, while only receiving benefits
from the city services. Section 1(h) was intended to alter this result by forbidding counties to use municipal property taxes to pay for services exclusively
provided for the unincorporated areas."14
The Florida supreme court modified the literal import of section 1(h) in
City of St. Petersburgv. Briley, Wild & Associates, Inc.- In that case, several
municipalities challenged the county's use of ad valorem taxes to construct a
sewage treatment facility which primarily serviced non-municipal residents.
Although section 1(h) proscribed county taxation of municipal property to
finance services "exclusively" for the unincorporated areas, the supreme court
was unwilling to strictly interpret this constitutional language. The court
reasoned that a literal reading of the exclusivity requirement would enable
counties to legitimately fund activities in the unincorporated areas which only
insignificantly benefit city residents." 06 Accordingly, the court declared that the
constitutional framers meant to prohibit only those services for which the
municipalities received "no real or substantial benefit."'1 County services did
not have to directly or primarily benefit municipalities, but would be sufficiently real and substantial if they were more than "illusory, ephemeral and
inconsequential."' s Applying this new Briley standard, the court upheld the
sewage treatment expenditures in the unincorporated areas because the facility
would reduce health hazards for all county residents.119

112. Id. See also Comment, Toward Solving the Double Taxation Dilemma Among Florida's Local Governments: The Municipal Service Taxing Unit, 8 FiA. ST. U.L. REv. 749, 749

n.2. (1980).
113. Comment, supra note 112, at 752.
114. Id. at 755.
115. 239 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970).
116. Id. at 822. The court remarked that it was obliged to give effect to the "exclusive"
language of §l(h) according to its meaning and what the people must have understood it to
mean when they approved it. The literal interpretation of "exclusively," the court stated,
would lead to an unreasonable conclusion. Id. at 821.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 823.
119. Id. at 824. The court recognized that water pollution and the diseases caused by
water pollution know no city or county lines. Consequently, diseases originating from the unincorporated areas of the county resulting from improperly treated sewage could readily
spread throughout the county. Protection against such contamination and disease was not
merely an incidental or collateral benefit to the cities. However, the court stated that it could
conceive of other services that might have no consequential benefits to the cities. For example, neighborhood libraries, parks and recreation facilities or fire protection might solely
benefit the unincorporated areas.
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Subsequent supreme court decisions followed the Briley standard, 1 20 but
the court retreated from Briley's liberal approach in Alsdorf v. Broward
County.121 In Alsdorf, several mayors challenged a variety of Broward County
expenditures partially supported by city residents' property taxes. The court

recognized the logic of the county's position that requiring large counties to
separate tax dollars collected from the incorporated and unincorporated areas
would pose horrendous fiscal problems for the county administration.122 Moreover, the majority conceded that county operations might be virtually incapacitated by lawsuits and uncertainty in identifying "real and substantial
benefits. ' 1 2 Notwithstanding these problems, the Alsdorf court stated that it
was required to enforce the provisions of the constitution, even in the absence
of legislative guidelines clarifying section

1(h).

24

Rather than follow Briley and

uphold such county spending, the court remanded the case to the lower
court 125 with instructions to use its inherent equitable powers to fashion a

suitable remedy for both the county and the municipalities.126
Not oblivious to the problems involved in enforcing section 1(h), the state
120. E.g., Burke v. Charlotte County, 286 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1973). See also Dressel v. Dade
County, 219 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969) (decided without reference to section l(h)).
In Bearden v. Metropolitan Dade County, 258 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1972), cert. denied,
263 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1972), Dade County imposed an excise tax on utility services purchased
in the unincorporated areas. Plaintiff alleged that the tax ordinance was invalid because by
placing the tax proceeds in the county's general fund, there was no assurance that the proceeds would be used solely for the unincorporated areas. The court held the fact that municipal taxpayers might receive some benefit from the tax did not invalidate the ordinance.
Rather, the court presumed that public officials would act properly in distributing the tax
revenue.
121. 333 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1976).
122. Id. at 459. The court noted that if there were any practical way to avoid a less
horrendous result the court would adopt it, but neither the two parties nor the court could
conceive of a plausible solution.
123. Id.
124. Id. The Alsdorf court specifically established that §1(h) was self-executing in nature.
That is, with or without legislative interpretation, the courts were required to draw the lines
between accepted and prohibited municipal taxation. See Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 851
(Fla. 1960).
125. Alsdorf v. Broward County, 373 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979). On remand from
the Supreme Court of Florida, the trial court determined that the county programs relating
to libraries, emergency medical services, and parks and recreation were not of real and substantial benefit to city residents. Nevertheless, the trial court exercised its equity powers by
refusing to order the county to repay its improperly spent revenue. On appeal, the district
court affirmed the trial court's factual findings and held the trial court could properly deny
municipal refunds. The district court emphasized that the county had acted in good faith,
and that there was a total failure of proof as to the proper amount of refunds. The court
stressed, however, that the decision was limited to its facts and should not be hailed as
precedent for violating section I(h). Id. at 701.
126. Justice Boyd dissented in the Alsdorf decision, warning that the supreme court
should be aware that Broward was one of the fastest growing counties in the nation. In addition, Justice Boyd noted that it was hard to imagine a Broward County expenditure which
would not be of at least some real and substantial benefit to city residents. Requiring such a
large county to separate tax dollars would be an unrealistic imposition. The Justice stated
that the majority's opinion should therefore be limited to rural or semi-rural areas with
clearly identifiable municipalities. 333 So. 2d at 461.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol33/iss4/3

18

Graetz: Charter County Government in Florida: Past Litigation and Future

1981]

CHARTER GOVERNMENT IN FLORIDA

legislature attempted to clarify the provision in 1974 by adopting a comprehensive act designed to facilitate solutions to double taxation.'12 The act empowered counties to create municipal service taxing units in the unincorpo128
rated areas, thereby shifting the tax burden away from municipal residents.
An administrative procedure was also created which permitted municipalities
to petition county commissioners regarding allegedly improper county spending. 29 The legislature, however, failed to provide an administrative method
for adjudicating contested claims or calculating the amount of refunds to
which a municipality might be entitled.3 °
Despite the legislative loopholes in the implementation of section 1(h), the
supreme court cautioned in Manatee County v. Town of Longboat Key' 3 ' that

courts should not determine lines of permissible taxation in areas best left to
the legislature. 3 2 This new posture represented a retreat from the assertive position in Alsdorf requiring courts to interpret and enforce constitutional provisions despite the financial consequences. 83 The Manatee County decision also
held that courts could order county commissioners to abide by the legislature's
administrative procedures, but could not calculate monetary refunds for improper taxation in the absence of legislative approval. 3 4 Additionally, the
court affirmed that section 1(h) applied only to property taxes, and warned the
legislature that counties could still use other sources of municipally-derived
revenues for the exclusive benefit of unincorporated areas. 3 5 As a result of
Manatee County, the legislature amended the statutes by adopting a formula
for calculating the proper amount of municipal refunds a county might be
obligated to pay and expanding the double taxation provisions to include all
county sources of revenue.'8s
127. FLA. STAT. §125 (1979).
128. Id. §125.01(1)(q), (r). Counties were also permitted to create special taxing districts,
which, unlike municipal service taxing units, could be established in both the incorporated
and unincorporated areas. Id. §125.01(5)(a)-(c) (1979). See Comment, supra note 112, at 760-61.
129. FLA. STAT. §125.01(6) (1979). As originally enacted in 1974, the statute permitted a
municipal commission or at least ten percent of the qualified municipal electors to petition
the county commissioners regarding allegedly improper tax spending. Within 90 days, the
county commissioners were required to file a response which either reflected action to correct improper spending or rejected the allegations with findings of factual support. There
was originally no express mention of what should be done should the county ignore the
petition or should the city and county fail to reach an adequate agreement. But see note 136
infra.
180. Manatee County v. Town of Longboat Key, 865 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1978). See note 129

supra.
131. 865 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1978).
182. Id. at 149.
188. See text accompanying notes 128-124 supra.
184. 365 So. 2d at 147-48. Accord, Sarasota County v. Town of Longboat Key, 875 So. 2d
847 (Fla. 1979). The Manatee County decision reversed a line of lower court decisions which
held that the courts could mandate money judgments. In fact, the courts had actually established judicial formulas for calculating the amount of municipal refunds. See Manatee County
v. Town of Longboat Key, 852 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977); Sarasota County v. Town of
Longboat Key, 858 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 2d D.CA. 1977).
185. 865 So. 2d at 148.
186. FA. STAT. §§125.01(6)(a), (7) (1979). The legislature adopted a formula for calculat-
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The legislature has been attempting to deal with the intricacies of the
double taxation issue, but problems of constitutional interpretation and enforcement continue to plague the judiciary and the counties. 3s Nevertheless,
the legislative framers of the proposed 1978 constitution would have retained
section 1(h) in virtually identical form. 138 Although the potential inequities of
double taxation are an appropriate subject for statewide concern, 39 Florida
lawmakers should re-examine the taxation provision in light of its applicability
to charter governments. Thus far, charter counties have tended to be large
metropolitan entities which might face unmanageable bookkeeping problems
if forced to separate municipal and non-municipal tax dollars.'40 Moreover,
the practical value of such a procedure is questionable because it is likely that
any expenditure made by the populous charter counties would have some real
or substantial benefit to municipal residents.' 4' Finally, the policy of Florida
home rule supports control of local matters by county charter. 42 Thus, it would
be consistent with our philosophy of charter counties to allow each charter
county electorate to determine the proper use of property taxes. Accordingly,
Florida lawmakers should evaluate the desirability of amending the double
taxation provision to conform to these considerations.
Both the section 4 transfer of powers provision and the section 1(h) county
taxation provision attempt to address legitimate concerns of local government.
These concerns should be examined, however, in light of the constitutional
purpose for creating charter governments. The state interest in sponsoring
charter home rule seems to outweigh the interest in strictly construing section
4, especially because such construction has produced results apparently contrary to the legislature's intent. 43 The best solution to the transfer of powers
problem is the adoption of legislation which clarifies section 4's role as a
flexible rather than a restrictive provision. It is less evident that the spirit of
charter home rule should take precedence over the section 1(h) provisions, i,:
ing the proper amount of municipal refunds a county might be obliged to pay. Id. § 125.01(6)(a)
(1979). In addition, the legislature expanded the double taxation provisions to include all
county revenue sources. Id. §125.01(7) (1979).
137. E.g., City of Ormond Beach v. County of Volusia, 383 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 5th D.C.A.
1980). The charter county used municipal property taxes to support a county library even
though the city operated its own library system. The court examined the city and county
systems and determined that each local entity offered distinct services. As a result, the court
determined that the county library service was of real and substantial benefit to city residents.
See notes 79-80 and accompanying text, supra.
138. FLA. PROPOSED CONST. art. VIII, §1(h) (1978). See also Symposium, supra note 56, at
1204. The new provision would have omitted the word "exclusively" and added Briley's real
and substantial benefit language.
139. Merely because a constitutional provision imposes burdens on a county does not
necessarily mean the provision is undesirable. However, although the purpose behind §1(h) is
valid, §1(h) may realistically be unenforceable in large charter counties.
140. Alsdorf v. Broward County, 333 So. 2d at 461.
141. Id. Justice Boyd noted in his Alsdorf dissent that it was hard to conceive of a
Broward County expenditure in the unincorporated areas which would not be of some real
and substantial benefit to city residents. Id. See note 126 supra.
142. See text accompanying notes 27-31 & 41 supra.
143. See text accompanying notes 95-99 supra,
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light of the legitimate state concern over double taxation. It may be inefficient,
14
however, to apply the double taxation provisions to large charter counties.
Consequently, a more practical approach would be to interpret or amend section 1(h) to allow charter counties the option of establishing their own workable safeguards against unfair taxation. Notwithstanding these proposals, the
initial theory of state constitutional supremacy remains sound and should continue to bind charter counties unless the intent of the constitutional framers
suggests otherwise.
Conflicts with State GeneralLaw
The second major area of controversy concerning charter governments involves determining when general statutory law prevails over charter provisions.
Section 1(g) of article VIII provides that charter enactments must not be "inconsistent" with general law. 45 This provision seeks to maintain state supremacy in matters of statewide concern. 14 Accordingly, charter ordinances will
usually be deemed inconsistent with state laws where the county attempts to
legislate in an area preempted by the state. Preemption usually occurs when
the legislature reserves to itself exclusive regulation of a given subject. M On
the other hand, statutes and ordinances may be consistent where they legitimately cover the same subjects, even though the ordinances do not mirror the
words of the statutes. For example, some decisions have upheld ordinances
which were apparently inconsistent with state laws where the state appeared to
only be setting minimum standards of control.' 4 In addition, courts have
validated ordinances which can harmoniously coexist with parallel statutes. 49
Thus, the constitutional prohibition of inconsistent ordinances implies actual
conflict with state law.
State preemption issues frequently arise when the legislature fails to clarify
whether it intends to retain exclusive control over a given area.5 0 Therefore,
the requisite legislative intent must be gleaned from the wording of the statute.
The uncertainty of this approach has led some courts to reject state domination
of an area in the absence of express statutory authorization. For example, in
Broward County v. Fort Lauderdale Christian School'51 the district court refused to conclude that the legislature intended to exclusively regulate certain
food licensing. In that case, the county sued to enjoin a school food service
from operating without a permit as required by charter ordinance52 A Florida
144. See text accompanying notes 139-142 supra.
145. FrA. CONsr. art. VIII, §l(g) (1968). See text accompanying note 47 supra.
146. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
147. Jordan Chapel Freewill Baptist Church v. Dade County, 334 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1976).
148. See text accompanying notes 157-161 infra.
149. See text accompanying notes 162-175 infra.
150. Cf. Op. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 078-131 (1978) (power to regulate taking or possession of
saltwater fish expressly reserved to state); Op. Arr'Y GEN. FLA. 075-213 (1975) (state preemption of regulation or possession of saltwater fish); Op. Ar'Y GEN. FLA. 073-95 (1973) (state

statute preemption of conflicting Sarasota County charter ordinance).
151. 366 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979).
152. Id. at 1265.
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statute, however, exempted school cafeterias from certain licensing requirements. 153 The trial court dismissed the county's action on the theory that the
state had preempted the field and that the ordinance was therefore inconsistent
with general law.54 The district court reversed, holding that the statute ex55
empted rather than included school cafeterias in its licensing requirements.1
Because school cafeteria regulation fell outside of statutory concern, the county
1 56
was permitted to establish its own criteria in the area.
Where statutes and ordinances directly address the same subjects and no
preemption issues are involved, an inconsistent county provision may still be
upheld if the state is simply establishing minimum standards.'1' The effect of
minimum standard statutes on county ordinance-making powers is illustrated
by a Third District Court of Appeal decision upholding a county licensing
ordinance. 8 The charter ordinance in that case tracked state law by prohibit69
ing licenses for night clubs within 2,500 feet of churches or public schools.' A
different county measuring system was adopted, however, which effectively
lengthened the distance requirement. The court stated that a conflict would
have occurred if the feet requirement were changed to something less than
2,500 feet. 60 No inconsistency was created by increasing the statutory distance,
however, since the state law merely represented minimum licensing standards.' 6'
The Third District Court of Appeal clarified the minimum standards doc62
trine in Jordan Chapel Freewill Baptist Church v. Dade County. In Jordan
Chapel, a local church claimed that the county lacked authority to enact an
ordinance relating to bingo because the state had preempted this field through
general law. The relevant statute permitted certain charitable, nonprofit organizations to conduct bingo games if they met certain criteria .13 County
commissioners added to the statute by imposing significantly stricter requirements for conducting charitable bingo games. 6 4 The Jordan Chapel court first
noted that the county had both implied and express charter powers to regulate bingo. 65 The court then examined the statutory language for evidence of
a legislative intent to prohibit more stringent regulations by local governments. 166 Because the court found no such intent, it held that the statute merely
153.

Id. See

FLA. STAT.

§509.24](2)(b)(1) (1979).

154. 366 So. 2d at 1265.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Jordan Chapel Freewill Baptist Church v. Dade County, 334 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1976).
158. Metropolitan Dade County Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Rockmatt Corp., 231 So. 2d 41

(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1970).
159.
(1970).
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 42-43. FLA.

§561.44(2) (1970);

DADE

COUNTY HOME RuLE CHARTER,

§1.02(A)

231 So. 2d at 45.
Id.
334 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976).

163. Id. at 662.
164.
165.
166.

STAT.

FLA. STAT.

§849.093 (1976).

334 So. 2d at 662. Dade County, Fla., Ordinance 75-50 (July 2, 1975).
334 So. 2d at 662.
Id. at 664.
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constituted minimum requirements and that the ordinance had a supplementary effect. 1 1
The Jordan Chapel court defined inconsistency as a situation where the
adherence to one governmental provision would require violation of another.168
The court held, however, that legislative provisions would not be inconsistant
with charter ordinances where the two could exist simultaneously.69 In determining whether the two provisions could co-exist, the court stated that it must
examine whether compliance with the county ordinance results in a violation
17 0
of state law or renders compliance with the state law impossible.
The Jordan Chapel definition of inconsistency has not been the guiding
principle in all cases involving conflicting state and county laws. In Scavella
v. Fernandez,'1 7 the Third District Court of Appeal distinguished Jordan
Chapel in ruling on a charter county ordinance which was at least facially
inconsistent with a general statute. The county ordinance required that
claims against the county be filed within sixty days after an accident or injury, while the state statutes authorized a three-year notice period.12 Relying
on the Jordan Chapel principle that an inconsistency is evidenced by the
mutual exclusivity of state and county provisions, the county argued that one
could comply with both laws simply by giving notice within the county's sixtyday period. The district court rejected the reliance on Jordan Chapel, explaining that the legislation involved in that case was prohibitory-regulatory,
whereas the legislation in the instant case was permissive.Y The majority
reasoned that the state had effectively granted citizens a positive right to a
three-year notice period, and what the "legislature hath granted, the Commission may not take away - even in part."117 4 Thus, Jordan Chapel was limited
to situations where the state either forbids certain conduct or sets a minimum
standard of behavior7a
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. See State ex rel. Dade County v. Brautigan, 224 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1969).
170. 334 So. 2d at 664. The Jordan Chapel court also relied on the federal decision, E.B.
Elliot Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1970). The
Elliot decision involved a Florida state law that required at least a 15-foot setback between
outdoor signs and the highway. A Dade County ordinance required at least a 200-foot setback. In applying Florida law, the federal court found no conflict between the state law and
the more stringent ordinance. The test was whether the statute and the ordinance were contradictory in the sense that they could not coexist. Id. at 1150. Cf. Retail Credit Co. v. Dade
County, Florida, 393 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (giving standard for determining whether
county ordinance was inconsistent with federal statute).
171. 371 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979).
172.

Id. FLA. STAT. §768.28(6) (1977); MEMOPOLTAN DADE COUNTY CODE

§2-2

(1977).

173. 371 So. 2d at 536. The court compared the Jordan Chapel rationale to dicta in an
Ohio decision, where the Ohio court declared that "no real conflict can exist unless the ordinance declares something to be right which the state law declares to be wrong, or vice versa."
Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio 263, 263, 140 N.E. 519, 521 (1923). The Ohio court
also noted that there can be no conflict unless one entity grants a permit or license to do a
thing which is forbidden by another.
174. 371 So. 2d at 537.
175. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1981

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [1981], Art. 3
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. XXXIII

Counties which have proposed ordinances similar to those reflected in
Jordan Chapel and Scavella176 have expressed confusion in ascertaining the
validity of such ordinances.177 The numerous requests for Attorney General
opinions interpreting general law illustrate the extent of county uncertainty in
this area.1 7 8 The courts have attempted to clarify the scope of state law by
distinguishing between legislation which preempts certain subjects, sets minimum guidelines, imposes mandatory restrictions, or permits supplementary
regulation by the county. 79 Thus, to protect the validity of charter provisions,
176. It should be noted that both charter and non-charter counties must yield to statewide laws. Consequently, the foregoing judicial principles adopted by the courts apply to
both types of counties. However, charter counties should be particularly cognizant of the
scope of general laws since such laws may invalidate charter provisions as well as county
ordinances.
See Hackney v. Cummer, No. 80-3533 at 405 (12th Cir. Ct. Fla. 1980). In Hackney, the
Sarasota County Charter Review Board created a new revised charter to be submitted to
the voters at a special election pursuant to §7.1 of the charter. There was considerable publicity concerning the proposed revision, including public hearings, speaking engagements, and
publication of the full charter in a major newspaper. Florida law, however, affirmatively
required the county to publish notice of special referendums at least once during the third
and fifth weeks prior to voting. FLA. STAT. §100.342 (1979). Although the county electorate
approved the proposed charter, the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court invalidated the election
results because the county had not substantially complied with the statute. The court stated
that the statutory provisions were mandatory, and could not be obviated through other types
of media coverage. Nevertheless, the court noted parenthetically that the need for such
statutory notice may no longer be required in light of moderm-day media coverage, but the
legislature should address such change.
The trial court judicially noticed that the proposed charter had been defeated prior to the
counting of the absentee ballots, and was ultimately approved by a margin of only 457 votes.
These facts apparently bolstered the trial court's decision to invalidate the election results.
In any event, the present status of Sarasota's charter is unclear and the issue is currently being
appealed by the Charter Review Board. Devine v. Cummer, appeal docketed, No. 81-103 (Fla.
2d D.C.A. 1981).
177. E.g., Iley v. Harris, 345 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1977); Purdy v. Woodard, 369 So. 2d 105
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979); Op. ATr'Y GsN. FLA. 076-9 (1976).
178. E.g., Op. ATr'y GEN. FLA. 079-38 (1979); Op. A-r'y GEN. FLA. 073-95 (1973).
179. In Merrill v. Dade County, 272 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973) an ordinance was
proposed through initiative procedure to repeal a county-levied utility tax in unincorporated
areas. However, the 1972 Revenue Sharing Act provided that a municipal body could not
prohibit the levy of utility service taxes. The court held that the proposed repealer did not
violate the Revenue Sharing Act, since the ordinance's effect was to repeal the utility tax and
not to prohibit it. The court noted that if the repealer were passed, a provision of the charter
might conflict with the Revenue Act, but the court failed to address the consequences of such
a result.
Cf. Board of County Comm'rs of Dade County v. Wilson, 386 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1980), on
remand 286 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 1980) (proposed ordinance which would set the millage rate
through the initiative petition process was in direct conflict with Florida Statute §200.191);
Johnson v. Alexander, 219 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979) (non-charter board of county
commissioners could not exercise discretion in granting palmistry license where applicant met
statutory requirements); General Elec. Credit v. Metropolitan Dade County, 346 So. 2d 1049
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977) (statute prevailed over zoning review procedures of county code to the
extent the two conflict); Dade County v. Acme Specialty Corp., 292 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1974) (portion of Dade County ordinance banning the sale of sparklers was invalid where sale
of sparklers had specifically been approved by state).
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each charter county must closely examine all county ordinances with statutory
counterparts in light of the judicial principles espoused by the courts. 80
Furthermore, charter counties must reexamine their ordinances each time the
legislature enacts relevant legislation, since a change in law might inadvertently
nullify charter ordinances. 8"
The 1978 proposed constitution continued to bind charter counties to general law, despite the inherent definitional problems in recognizing inconsistent
legislation. 18 2 Some of these definitional problems, however, could be alleviated

without endangering the supremacy of state law. For example, more precise
legislative drafting might enable counties to better determine the intended

scope of statutory provisions.'8 3 Legislative commentaries might also clarify
180. The principles concerning conflicts with the state differ slightly with respect to Dade
County. Charter counties may not enact legislation which is "inconsistent" with state law,
but Dade County's amendment provides that state and local provisions may not "conflict".
Nevertheless, the courts apparently have not focused on the technical distinction between the
two terms. For example, the Jordan Chapel decision involved a Dade County ordinance, and
the court proceeded to discuss both "conflict[ing]" and "inconsistent" legislation. The court
defined the word "conflict" as used in the 1956 home rule amendment as "contradictory in
the sense of legislative provisions which cannot co-exist." 334 So. 2d at 664. This definition is
quite similar to the court's other definitions of inconsistency, thus it seems the two terms are
virtually interchangeable.
In addition, Dade County ordinances are permitted to conflict with state laws in certain
enumerated areas. E.g., FLA. CoNsr. art. VIII, §ll(1)(c), (f) (1885). However, the judiciary has
generally strictly construed this authority against the county. For example, in Metropolitan
Dade County v. City of Miami, No. 57, 406 (Fla. Oct. 16, 1980), Dade County enacted a comprehensive taxicab ordinance which purported to regulate taxicabs within the municipalities.
A Florida statute granted charter counties such authority, but provided that municipalities
could retain their existing power to regulate taxicabs unless the municipal residents voted
to transfer their powers to the county. The Florida supreme court held that Dade County
had impermissibly conflicted with state law by usurping municipal taxicab powers. Although
the court recognized that Dade County ordinances could conflict with state law under authority of the 1956 home rule amendment, the county could only do so in areas specifically authorized by the 1956 amendment. Id. The court also addressed the §4 transfer of powers problem
in that case. See text accompanying notes 83-89 supra. See also Dade County v. Lambert, 334
So. 2d 844 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976). But see City of Sweetwater v. Dade County, 343 So. 2d 953
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977) (manner of changing boundaries of municipalities was governed by
Dade home rule amendment despite statutory method of changing boundaries).
Several pre-1968 cases had similarly held that Dade County ordinances generally could not
supercede state law. See, e.g., Seminole Rock Products, Inc. v. Town of Medley, 180 So. 2d
457 (Fla. 1965); Board of County Comm'rs. of Dade County v. Boswell, 167 So. 2d 866 (Fla.
1964); Kaulakis v. Boyd, 138 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1962).
181. The legislature might simply intend to change some general requirement in an effort
to improve regulation of a subject area. On the other hand, the legislature might also purposefully intend to preempt certain charter provisions by adopting particularly expansive legislation. Accordingly, charter ordinances which have imposed certain unpopular requirements may
be invalidated under the Jordan Chapelrationale.
182. FLA. PRorosro CoNsT. art. VIII, §l(g) (1978).
183. Clearer legislative drafting may not be a panacea for all charter ordinance-state law
conflicts, but it would certainly provide helpful clues for charter counties and courts which
are trying to determine legislative intent. One example of a legislative provision which clearly
expresses legislative intent is illustrated by Fla. Laws, ch. 73-208 (codified in FLA. STAT.
§125.01(4) (1973)). The provision states: "The legislative and governing body of a county shall
not have the power to regulate the taking or possession of salt water fish, as defined in §370.01,
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statutory purposes. Even where the statutes remain ambiguous enough to require judicial interpretation, the courts would at least have more authoritative
guidelines to follow in rendering decisions. Moreover, the courts should continue to develop the judicial criteria used to recognize inconsistent legislation.
The application of such criteria to particular county ordinances challenged in
court would additionally serve as models for the drafters of county provisions.
Given the continuous enactment of charter ordinances and state laws, the
characterization and interpretation of particular statutes should continue on a
case-by-case basis. Legislative attentiveness to statutory drafting would assist
the courts in this task. The courts should continue to adhere to the principle
that statutory law generally overrides charter ordinances. 184 Nevertheless, both
the legislature and the judiciary should be cognizant of the need to balance
the state interest in uniform laws with the state interest in preserving charter
home rule.
Conflicts with Municipalities
The third major area of charter county litigation concerns the relationship
between county and municipal functions. Although section l(g) of article VIII
vests charter counties with wide home rule powers, 85 section 2 of that article
also grants municipalities potentially overlapping home rule powers' 86 The
cities are authorized to provide fire and police protection, maintain roads and
street lighting, and perform a host of other municipal services.1' 7 Both local
entities exercise their respective functions concurrently. Disagreements often
surface, however, when the municipalities suspect county encroachment on
municipal functions. Consequently, the courts must frequently reconcile the
Florida Statutes, with respect to the method of taking, size, number, season or species; provided, however, that this subsection shall not be construed to prohibit the imposition of
excise taxes by county ordinance. (b) All county ordinances purporting to regulate in any
manner the taking or possession of salt water fish, as defined in §370.01, Florida Statutes, are
hereby repealed." Id. Subsection (b) was omitted from the 1979 codified version of the Florida
Statutes. Although it might be argued that subsection (b) merely reiterates subsection (a),
subsection (b) nevertheless clearly delineates the county's lack of power to regulate salt
water fish.
184. Metropolitan Dade County v. City of Miami, No. 57, 406 (Fla. Oct. 16, 1980). The
Florida supreme court has not only recognized that state law may supercede charter ordinances, but has also maintained that state statutes and charter ordinances will be treated
differently for jurisdictional purposes. In Delano v. Dade, 287 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1973), afJ'd
293 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974), cert. dismissed, 312 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1975), Dade County
claimed that its charter ordinances should be treated the same as special legislative acts for
jurisdictional purposes. Such result would have allowed for direct appeal of county cases to
the supreme court. The court held, however, that its jurisdiction did not encompass home
rule ordinances absent some indication of authority for this result.
185. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
186. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §2. Section 2(b) provides: "Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and propriety powers to enable them to conduct municipal government,
perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for
municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law. Each municipal legislative body
shall be elective." Id. §2(b).
187. Id.
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competing philosophies of municipal and charter county home rule.""" The
attempt to clarify the relationship between these competing interests has produced two judicial theories. First, charter provisions may legitimately supercede otherwise valid city ordinances where the county has preempted a given
area. 18 9 Second, charter counties may invade the realm of municipal authority
when they are acting in a quasi-municipal capacity. 90
Charter preemption is analogous to the state preemption doctrine previously
discussed because, like the state, the county may reserve exclusive regulation of
a given subject to itself. 19' Unlike the state legislature, however, counties may
not unconditionally bind municipalities through county ordinances since mu1 92
nicipalities are also constitutionally entitled to exercise home rule powers.
In 1958, the judicial lines for determining the scope of charter preemption
9g
were drawn in the leading decision Miami Shores Village v. Cowart.1
The
Cowart decision concerned the validity of a Dade County ordinance which
created a master traffic-control plan and expressly nullified all municipal traffic
ordinances. The Florida supreme court affirmed the ordinance based on language in Dade County's 1956 home rule amendment which granted the county
all powers necessary to operate a centralized metropolitan government.1 94 The
decision stated that municipalities were guaranteed complete autonomy over
their purely local municipal functions.295 However, the county was authorized
to regulate those municipal services which were "susceptible to, and could be
most effectively carried on under, a uniform plan of regulation applicable to
the county as a whole."1 96
The supreme court affirmed the Cowart rationale in two pre-1968 cases
involving Dade County ordinances. 197 In addition, the Florida district courts
have utilized the Cowart doctrine in post-1968 charter county preemption
188. The theory behind municipal home rule and county home rule is basically the same;
both entities wish to be self-governing in matters of local concern. Problems arise when both
the municipalities and the counties exercise self-governing powers which overlap. For a summary of municipal home rule in Florida, see Juergensmeyer & Gragg, Limiting Population
Growth in Florida,26 U. FLA. L. REv. 597 (1973).
189. See text accompanying notes 191-218 infra.
190. See text accompanying notes 219-238 infra.
191. See text accompanying notes 150-156 supra.
192. FLA. CONsT. art. VIH, §2; FLA. STAT. §166.021 (1979).
193. 108 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1958).
194. Id. at 472.
195. Id. at 471.
196. Id.
197. The first case, State v. Dade County, 142 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1962), involved challenges
to the county's authority to purchase and operate a countywide transit system. The court
upheld the expenditures and stated that the county had inherent authority to finance countywide public services.
The second case, City of Coral Gables v. Burgin, 143 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1962), involved a
county licensing ordinance regulating plumbers and a conflicting municipal ordinance. The
superme court held that the county ordinance took precedence over the city ordinance since
the regulation of plumbing was not something that could be classified as purely local. Id. at
861. See also Carol City Utilities, Inc. v. Dade County, 183 So. 2d 227, 232 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.

1966).
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cases. 198 For example, a Third District Court of Appeal decision held that in
coordinating water management on an area-wide basis,' 9 9 a charter county had
the authority to control municipally-owned water systems. In that case, the
county water and sewer board imposed a temporary ban on connections to a
city-controlled water system. 200 The city alleged that utility connections were
a purely local matter subject only to municipal regulation. 20' Rejecting this
contention, the court found that the county sought only to regulate municipal
functions according to a countywide uniform plan. 20 Moreover, county control
of municipally-owned water systems was deemed to be essential to efficient
operation on an area-wide basis. 203
Similarly, in City of Hialeah Gardens v. Dade County,20 4 a district court
upheld the preemptive effect of a charter ordinance which interfered with a
city's right to negotiate franchise agreements. A 1960 Dade County ordinance
granted Florida Power and Light Company (FP&L) a thirty-year non-exclusive
franchise to provide electricity to county residents. 05 Despite this countywide
ordinance, at least five municipalities entered into separate franchise agreements with FP&L after 1960.206 One of these municipalities brought suit claiming that FP8cL was improperly paying a percentage of its revenue to the county,
a portion of which was derived from the sale of electricity to the municipalities. 0 7 The city maintained that the county had exceeded its authority in
198. E.g., OP. Arr'Y GEN. FLA. 074-244 (1974) (Dade County Charter preempts right of
municipalities to create special purpose taxing districts). Cf. City of Miami Beach v. Mutual
Benefit Life Ins. Co., 239 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1970) (charter county had exclusive
authority to adopt, enforce, amend or modify certain building construction codes).
199. City of North Miami Beach v. Metropolitan Dade County, 317 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1975).
200. Id.
201. Id. The city also claimed that the State Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services had exclusive supervisory jurisdiction over such matters, and that the county was
effectively preempted from further regulation by virtue of this exclusive jurisdiction. The
Department, speaking as amicus curiae, agreed that its jurisdiction was supreme, but qualified
the city's interpretation of state authority. The Department suggested that it had final supervisory responsibility over all systems of water supply only insofar as their "adequacy, sanitary
and physical condition" affect public health. The district court found it unnecessary to determine the scope of the state agency's jurisdiction, since it was clear that the county was not
attempting to override state authority. Id.
202. Id. at ll.
203. Id. at 112.
204. 348 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977).
205. Dade County, Fla., Ordinance 60-16, §1 (1960).
206. 348 So. 2d at 1179.
207. Id. at 1176. The trial judge initially dismissed Hialeah Gardens' complaint and
denied a rehearing. However, the Village of Virginia Gardens filed a petition for a second
rehearing and a motion to intervene, because Virginia Gardens had a franchise agreement
with Florida Power and Light (FP&L) which was entered into before 1960. Id. at 1177. On
rehearing, the trial court held that the ordinance preempted the right of those municipalities
which had no franchise agreement in 1960 to enter into future negotiations with FP&L. The
court stated as a matter of dictum and without specifically ruling that FP&L could not enter
into renewal franchises with municipalities whose agreements were about to expire. Id. at 1178.
The district court affirmed the trial court's ruling. Id. at 1180.
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granting the 1960 franchise. In addition to damages, the city also sought to
enjoin the county from interfering with municipal franchise agreements.
Citing Cowart, the Third District Court of Appeal noted that electric
208
utility regulation was not a purely local matter. Rather, utility corporations
are uniquely susceptible to the kind of uniform regulation envisaged by the
county ordinance. 20 9 Because this kind of authority was also consistent with the
governing powers contemplated by charter home rule, the court reasoned that
the county ordinance preempted the city's right to enter into its own agreements. 210 Moreover, the county was not estopped to assert its preemptive rights,
even though it had taken no action against those municipalities which had
already negotiated post-1960 franchises. 21" The district court indicated that the
application of estoppel on these facts would seriously hinder the operation of
2 12
home rule charter powers.
The Cowart line of cases appears to favor the dominance of charter county
powers over municipal home rule functions in areas that can not be characterized as purely local. 21 3 Two legislative pronouncements have tacitly approved
this judicial mandate. The Municipal Home Rule Powers Act was enacted to
secure the development of municipal home rule, 2' 4 yet the Act also expressly
prohibited municipalities from legislating on any subject matter preempted by
a chartered county.2 15 In addition, the Optional County Charter Law authorized charter county commissioners to adopt those county ordinances necessary
for the health, safety, and welfare of the residents.216 The legislature also explicitly recognized that chartered counties could determine which governmental
services were most conducive to uniform countywide control and could provide
for enforcement powers in these areas. 21' At first glance, the two statutory provisions appear to endow charter counties with expansive powers at the expense
208. Id. at 1178.
209. Id. at 1179.
210.

Id.

211. Id. See text accompanying note 206 supra.
212. 348 So. 2d at 1180. The district court stated that it would not restrain an otherwise
valid charter county function in the absence of a clear showing of unjust consequences by

the party seeking to effect the estoppel.
213. See text accompanying notes 194-212 supra. See also State ex rel. City of Miami
Beach v. Metropolitan Dade County Water & Sewer Bd., 347 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 3d D.CA. 1977),
cert. denied, 866 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1978) (Dade County had power to regulate water charges
levied by a municipality to customers outside of city's territorial jurisdiction).
214. FL4. STAT. §§166.011-.411 (1979).
215. Id. at §166.021(3)(d) (1979). The statute grants municipalities the power to enact

legislation concerning any subject matter upon which the legislature may act, except "any
subject preempted to a county pursuant to a county charter adopted under the authority of
§§l(g), 3 and 6(e), Art. VIII" of the Constitution. Id. The legislature apparently adopted a
more expansive approach to charter county preemption than it did to non-charter county
preemption. In contrast, subsection (c) provides that municipalities have legislative powers
except regarding any subject "expressly preempted to state or county government by the
constitution or by general law." FLA. STAT. §166.021(8)(c) (1979) (emphasis supplied).
216. FLA. STAT. §§125.80-.88 (1979). See note 72 supra. The Optional Charter County Law

also provided three forms of optional charter governments and defined some of the executive

and legislative duties of charter county officials. Id. See note 43 supra.
217. FLA. STAT. §125.86(7) (1979). See note 72 supra.
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of municipally-controlled functions. Municipal residents, however, may undercut some of this power by adopting provisions in the county charter which
21
preserve municipal control.
County preemption of traditionally municipal functions may effectively
convert charter counties into quasi-municipalities.219 Under such circumstances,
the counties might become subject to the rights and liabilities imposed on all
municipal units. In the leading decision of State v. Brautigam,220 Dade County
was transformed into a municipal entity for the purpose of levying cigarette
taxes. Dade County's 1956 home rule amendment gave the county authority to
2 1
exercise all powers normally conferred upon municipalities by general law. 2
222
The relevant state statute in that case only allowed cities to impose cigarette
taxes, but Dade County attempted to levy a cigarette tax on its unincorporated
areas by virtue of its home rule municipal powers.2 23 The Florida supreme
court examined the legislative intent behind Dade County's special authority
and concluded that the county should have at least the same taxation powers
as the cities. 224 Consequently, Dade County would be included in the class "all
municipalities" in statutes conferring local powers.2 25
The impact of Brautigam on other charter counties was not clarified until
the supreme court's decision in State ex rel. Volusia County v. Dickinson.226
That case involved a Volusia County charter provision which gave the county
all municipal powers needed to fulfill the intent of the charter.227 Like Dade,

Volusia attempted to collect the proceeds from a municipal cigarette tax. The
218. Charter government per se is merely a framework for self-government which derives
powers from the legislature and its own charter. County residents, some of whom are municipal residents, can to some extent manipulate the county's regulatory powers over municipalities by proper drafting of the charter. For example, county residents can provide that municipal ordiances prevail over county ordinances to the extent of conflict. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
219. E.g. State ex rel. Dade County v. Nuzum, 372 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1979) (Dade County
viewed as an unincorporated municipality for purposes of statute authorizing return of
beverage licensing revenues); Bearden v. Metropolitan Dade County, 258 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1972), cert. denied, 263 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1972) (Dade County authorized by charter to
levy all taxes statutorily permitted to be levied by municipalities). See also Op. ATr'Y GEN.
FLA. 074-341 (1974); Op. A-r'Y GuN. FLA. 074-342 (1974); Op. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 074-145 (1974).
220. 244 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1969).
221. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §6(f). Dade County was authorized to exercise "all powers conferred now or hereafter by general law upon municipalities." Id.
222. FLA. STAT. §210.03 (1969) (amended 1972). Section 210.03 was amended in 1972 and
now provides that municipalities can not levy or collect any excise tax on cigarettes. FLA. STAT.
§210.03 (1979).
223. 224 So. 2d at 691. Dade County attempted to impose the "municipal" tax on the unincorporated areas of the county.
224. Id. at 692. The court recognized that one of the serious drawbacks of the 1956 Dade
County Home Rule Amendment was that the county had limited taxing powers. However,
the county was increasingly called upon to provide municipal-type services to the unincorporated areas yet had no more taxing power than a small rural county. Section 6(f) of the
1968 constitution was adopted to give Dade County municipal authority to levy and collect
taxes. Id. at 693.

225. Id.
226. 269 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1972).
227. COUNTY OF VOLUSA HOME RULE

CHARTER,
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supreme court held that a charter county created under section l(g) of article
VIII was automatically vested with inherent powers of self-government, including those powers constitutionally granted to municipalities. 22 8 Therefore, the
court concluded that any charter county could impose those taxes which a
229
municipality could levy under general law.
Although the quasi-municipal status of counties has been expanded to include areas other than tax collection, 230 this doctrine may be limited by principles of equity. For example, the Third District Court of Appeal refused to
allow a charter county to escape liability from suit on the basis of a short
statute of limitations period pertaining to municipalities.2 31 In reaching this
result, the court examined whether county assertion of its municipal status
would somehow produce inequitable results. 23 2 Since the county had previously
operated under the filing deadline applicable to all counties, the county was
not permitted to bar an otherwise valid cause of action by virtue of its munici233
pal character.
Charter counties which acquire the benefits of municipal authority may also
inadvertently acquire the costs of municipal liability.234 Although at least one
jurisdiction had refused to extend municipal liability to the counties based on

theories of sovereign immunity,2- the enactment of limited waiver statutes has

increased the possibility that counties will incur liability for their municipal
activities.2 30 Charter counties are particularly likely to acquire legal responsibilities when they preempt a city's normal functions by providing municipal-type
services. 237 Under such circumstances, cities will probably argue they should
228. 269 So. 2d at 10-11.
229. Id. at 11.
230. See, e.g., Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp. v. County of Volusia, 348 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1977). Hudson Pulp challenged the constitutionality of a Volusia County ordinance
which established a Municipal Service District and provided for ad valorem taxes. The district court stated that by virtue of being a charter county, Volusia was vested with all necessary powers to accomplish municipal services within special districts. The ordinance was duly
enacted by the county's governing body and provided traditional municipal service and thus
withstood constitutional challenge. Id. at 45. But cf. Op. ATr'y GEN. FLA. 077-21 (1977)
(charter counties establishing municipal service units not entitled to municipal share of
revenue-sharing funds).
231. Dade County v. Lambert, 334 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 3d D.CA. 1976).
232. Id. at 846.
233. Id. The court noted that to allow the county its municipal status in the instant case
would permit the county to pick and choose which statute of limitations it wished to rely
upon, depending on the facts of the case at hand.
234. A.L. Lewis Elementary School v. Metropolitan Dade County, 376 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d
D.CA. 1979).
235. McPhee v. Dade County, 362 So. 2d 74, 80 (Fla. 3d D.CA. 1978). In McPhee, the
district court rejected appellant's claim that Dade was liable in tort as a municipality. The
court found that "having additional powers of a municipality does not automatically give
Dade County municipal responsibilities". Id. The concurring opinion in McPhee noted that
the tort occurred before the effective date of the state's general waiver of sovereign immunity statute in 1975. The judge opined that a substantially different question would have
been presented if the 1975 statute were effective.
236. FLA. STAT. §§768.29-.80 (1979).
237. See, e.g., A.L. Lewis Elementary School v. Metropolitan Dade County, 376 So. 2d 32
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not be legally accountable for governmental operations over which they have
3

no control.2 s

The 1968 constitution granted local governing authority to both charter
counties and municipalities, but left the courts and legislature with the prob3 9
lem of apportioning specific powers. 2 The judiciary has apparently favored

charter county control over municipal control where practical, via the doctrines of charter preemption and quasi-municipality status. Similarly, the legislature has supported the supremacy of charter provisions despite its simul2 40
Charter counties should
taneous intent to promote municipal home rule.

therefore be aware of the broad extent of their local authority and their opportunities to use such authority to develop expansive county-wide programs.
Nonetheless, charter counties should carefully consider their potential legal
liabilities before assuming municipal-type functions.
The presumptions in favor of charter governance do not necessarily sound
the death knell for local municipal rule. Municipal residents are also county
residents and are thus, to some extent, capable of restricting county activity by
amending the county charter. Moreover, municipalities are guaranteed certain
constitutional powers which cannot be unilaterally abolished by the counties. 24'
Therefore, while municipalities may be required to yield to county regulation
the city's functions cannot be completely
in matters of area-wide concern,
2 42
usurped by charter counties.
CONCLUSION

Despite the apparent advantages of the charter form of government, several
Florida counties have legitimately decided that such county government is not
suitable for their needs. 242 Other counties have favored home rule notions, but
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979). In A.L. Lewis, a state statute imposed on each municipality and county
the obligation to install and maintain traffic control devices. However, the county had by
charter ordinance undertaken the control of traffic in both the incorporated and unincorporated areas. Because the county had taken over the municipal traffic control powers, the
municipalities no longer were liable for negligent traffic control maintenance pursuant to the
state statute. Instead, the municipalities' duties and responsibilities were shifted to the county.
238. Id. at 35.
239. See County of Volusia v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, 356 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1978); City of Sweetwater v. Dade, 343 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977).
240. FLA. STAT. §166.021 (1979).
241. FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §2.
242. The 1978 proposed constitution continued to endorse municipal home rule, indicating support for the desirability of local city government. FLA. PROPOSED CoNsT. art. VIII, §2
(1978). Although counties could theoretically erode city powers on a piecemeal basis, municipal residents acting in their capacity as county residents could check such a result through
careful drafting of the grant of charter powers. See note 218 supra.
243. Non-charter counties may be disinterested in charter government for several reasons.
Many residents fear that charter governments will usurp the power of their municipalities and
thereby remove local government from their immediate control. Although charter governments
may preempt municipal functions, municipalities are vested with home rule powers which
can not generally be completely eradicated by the county. Moreover, residents can partially
control county powers through careful enactment of charter provisions. See notes 218 and 242
supra. Non-charter counties may also refuse charter adoption because they believe charter
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political and other considerations have prevented county residents from agreeing on the specific charter terms. In any event, the problems examined herein
require resolution in order to facilitate those counties still considering the
charter form of government 2 4 and to clarify the powers of the five established
governments simply create additional bureaucracies. The Independent Florida Alligator, May
4, 1981, at 11, col. I (advertisement). In addition, non-charter counties may feel that charter
governments are not necessary for the county. Charter adoption encourages the unification of
county services which traditionally is most needed in populous, urban counties. Therefore,
less populous counties may not need to provide countywide services on a scale as large as
those provided by charter counties.
244. Several Florida counties have apparently favored home rule notions, but have failed
to adopt a county charter. Often, the failure to adopt the charter stems from political or
other considerations which keep county residents from agreeing on the specific terms of a
charter plan. As previously noted, the precise terms of the charter generally determine the
extent of the county's power, rather than the charter framework itself.
Alachua County, Florida, recently proposed the adoption of a charter government which
was defeated at a county referendum on May 5, 1981. The political ramifications of adopting
county charters were explored in several articles in the Gainesville Sun newspaper and typify
the considerations many non-charter counties examine before preparing charters. One controversial subject concerned whether certain county offices should be elected or appointed
positions. Ed Crapo, the recently-elected county tax appraiser, disapproved the charter plan
because it removed the property appraiser, sheriff, tax collector, elections supervisor and
county clerk as constitutional officers and provided for the appointment rather than the
election of the offices of the elections supervisor and tax appraiser. Mr. Crapo felt the appointed county manager might be getting too many powers under the charter plan and not
enough powers were being retained by the county commission. Since the county manager
might virtually dominate the tax appraiser's office, Mr. Crapo was concerned that he might
be relegated to little more than a figurehead.
The League of Women Voters endorsed home rule in Alachua County, but agreed with Mr.
Crapo that the heads of the newly-created departments should be elected rather than appointed. Alachua County commissioners later conceded to the critics of the charter plan by
keeping all county posts elective which were already elective. Gainesville Sun, March 12, 1981,
§B, at 1, col. 4. Despite this concession, however, charter opponent Sheriff Lu Hindery maintained that it was impractical for elected officials to be under the jurisdiction of appointed
officials like the county manager. Commissioner John Schroepfer, a charter advocate, replied
that the county manager's job under the charter would be the same as the county manager's
present function. Mr. Schroepfer added that the charter amendment would give taxpayers
more accountability in county government, since under the charter the county commission
would acquire ultimate control over its department budgets. Charter opponents, however,
claimed that the charter plan would give taxpayers less accountability among county officials if the charter plan centralized power in appointed personnel.
Other areas of political controversy concerned whether county commissioners should be
limited to a certain number of terms in office, what kinds of provisions should be made for
future charter amendments, and whether there should be a charter review commission to
periodically reexamine the charter. Gainesville Sun, March 12, 1981, §B, at 1, col. 4. Interested
citizens quickly formed citizens' committees which supported both sides of the issue. Without citizen involvement, one writer noted, the charter issue might look like "just another
shooting match between jealous elected officials." Gainesville Sun, Feb. 15, 1981, §D, at 1, col.
2. County Commissioner Schroepfer indicated, however, that he did not see the charter fight
as another in a "long series of disputes between elected officials or a power struggle."
In any event, the political controversies at stake in the Alachua County charter proposition point out the difficulties in initially adopting the charter. See also Sibesta v. Miklas, 272
So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1972), (involving charter adoption and concurrent apportionment problems).
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charter counties.245 Specifically, in conflicts between the constitution and charter
provisions, the section 4 transfer requirements of article VIII should be legislatively modified to exclude charter counties from their application. Further, the
section 1(h) double taxation provision should be amended to accommodate the
philosophy of charter home rule. To alleviate the conflicts between general
laws and county provisions, the legislature should clearly delineate the intended scope of its statutory laws. Additionally, to reduce some of the tensions
inherent in the exercise of concurrent municipal and county powers, charter
counties should seek to reconcile their powers with the desires and powers of
the municipalities. Charter counties should also be cognizant of the benefits
and liabilities involved in assuming municipal functions.
The resolution of the case law arising from the inauguration of charter
counties requires a balancing of governmental policies. The legislature has
supported the policy of encouraging charter governments in order to shift local
rule from the state to the counties. In some instances, however, the concurrent
policy of maintaining constitutional or statutory superiority may outweigh
such local interests. In addition, the overlapping philosophies of county and
municipal home rule must be harmonized when state interests are not involved.
Where any of these competing policies conflict, the legislative intent and history behind the relevant provisions at issue should influence which policy will
prevail. The history of charter home rule indicates a particular constitutional
intent to grant expansive self-governing authority. The recognition of this
intent should be ever-present in resolving charter county litigation.
Lucy GRAETz
245. In a recent survey conducted by the author, a form letter was sent to each of sixtyone non-charter counties requesting information about charter activities in the county. Of
the twenty-three counties responding to the questionnaire, nine of the counties stated that
they had previously presented charter plans at county referendums. Six of the nine counties
had offered plans for voter approval more than once, indicating a willingness to pursue charter
adoption. Moreover, several of the referendums were scheduled within the past two or three
years or are scheduled for some time in 1981, suggesting that non-charter counties continue
to be amenable to the charter form of government.
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